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Abstract 
This study examines the cross-market efficiency of the FTSE/MIB index options contracts traded on the Italian 
derivatives market (IDEM) between 1st October 2007 and 31st December 2012, a period including the financial 
crisis, using daily option prices. Two fundamental no-arbitrage conditions are tested: the lower boundary 
condition (LBC) and the put/call parity (PCP) condition while taking into account the role of transaction costs 
in mitigating the number of violations reported. Ex-post tests of LBC and PCP revealed a low incidence of 
mispricing in this market. Furthermore, to check the robustness of the results obtained by the ex-post tests, ex-
ante tests were applied to PCP violations occurring within a one-day lag. The results showed a significant drop 
in the number of profitable arbitrage strategies. Overall, the number and monetary value of the violations 
reported declined during the post financial crisis period compared to those during the financial crisis period. 
The findings obtained from these tests generally support the cross-market efficiency of the Italian index options 
market during the sample period, though some violations were occasionally reported. 
 
JEL classification: G01, G14 
Keywords: Cross-market efficiency; index options market; no-arbitrage conditions; financial 
crisis 
 
  
                                                          
1 Corresponding Author: elkalaki@cardiff.ac.uk 
1. Introduction 
The rapidly-growing success of index options markets in both Europe and the US has 
drawn significant attention from many researchers trying to investigate the efficiency of these 
markets. The work of Stoll (1969) is considered to be the seminal research that paved the way 
for future empirical investigations on the efficiency of the derivatives markets.  
The majority of these studies have focused on studying the efficiency of the US 
derivative market (e.g. Evnine and Rudd (1985); Kamara and Miller (1995); Ackert and Tian 
(2001)). The empirical literature on the European markets is not only very limited but also 
mainly relates to the pre-Euro period, for example, the studies of Mittnik and Rieken (2000a) 
on the DAX index from 1992 to 1995; Cavallo and Mammola (2000) on the MIB30 index 
from 1996 to 1997; Chesney et al. (1995) on the Swiss index; and Puttonen (1993) on the 
Finnish index. To our knowledge, only two major investigations have been conducted on the 
Italian derivative market by Cavallo and Mammola (2000) and Torricelli and Brunetti (2003).  
Therefore, one of the main motivations in conducting this study is to provide a new 
insight into this market to capture the recent changes that occurred in the Italian market such 
as (i) the development and fast growth of the Italian market making it the fourth biggest 
derivative market in Europe, which has led to the creation of a wider range of options than 
studied in the previous studies, e.g. only one-month at-the-money options were previously 
considered; (ii) the introduction of the Euro and the subsequent financial crisis have led to 
new market rules affecting the efficiency of the Italian market which were not considered in 
previous studies; (iii) The Italian stock market known as “Borsa Italiana” has merged with the 
London Stock Exchange effective from the 1
st
 October 2007. Another motivation for this 
study is the sample period chosen where the efficiency of the Italian options market is being 
tested both during the peak of financial crisis period (2007-2009) and also during the period 
following this crisis (2010-2012).  
This paper aims to test the efficiency of the Italian derivative market, in particular, the 
cross-market efficiency of the FTSE/MIB index options contracts for the period between 1
st
 
October 2007 and 31
st
 December 2012. The sample period is then divided into the crisis 
period from 1
st
 October 2007 to 31
st
 December 2009 and the post crisis period from 1
st
 
January 2010 to 31
st
 December 2012. After applying various filtering criteria, our sample 
includes 61030 pairs of matched call and put options for the whole period. The cross-market 
efficiency of the FTSE/MIB index options market is tested by the calculation of both the 
lower boundary condition and the put-call parity (PCP) relationship.  
The lower boundary conditions were economically tested on an ex-post basis with 
respect to the frequency and size of the violations. In the first scenario tested no market 
frictions were considered and the frequency of violations observed showed a relatively high 
percentage of mispricing compared to other studies. When both bid/ask spread and 
transaction costs were considered, the percentage of violations dropped. Furthermore, the 
mean level of violations was moderate and did not exceed 200 Euros per contract for the 
whole sample. In addition, throughout the whole period in all the scenarios, the put options 
violated the lower boundary condition more often than the calls. Moreover, the results 
showed that investors can make extra profits when implementing a short strategy compared 
to a long one. This can be related to put options being overpriced relative to calls. These 
findings are quite different from the study conducted by Torricelli and Brunetti (2003) 
perhaps due to a recent rule partially limiting short selling in the Italian index market.  
Furthermore, in order to check the robustness of the results reported relating to the 
PCP tests and to find out to what extent the ex-post arbitrage opportunities can be exploited, 
ex-ante tests were carried out. Results showed that the incidences of PCP violations dropped 
remarkably even in the absence of transaction costs. When transaction costs are included, the 
percentage of violations decreased, even more, to be almost negligible for retail investors. 
These findings are in line with results reported in the study of Torricelli and Brunetti (2003). 
In conclusion, it can be said that the Italian index options market was efficient during the 
sample period studied. 
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. The first contribution is providing new 
evidence about the efficiency of the Italian options market through a more comprehensive 
and updated sample compared to previous studies and after taking into account the different 
economical changes that have happened in this market. The second contribution is related to 
the financial crisis where we compare the market efficiency of the Italian options market 
during the crisis with that during the post crisis period.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 covers the prior literature 
and provides the theoretical framework and main hypotheses. The dataset and methodology 
are outlined in section 3. Section 4 provides the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Put-call parity and lower boundary conditions as evidence of cross-market efficiency 
have long been studied in the literature since the seminal work of Stoll (1969) and Merton 
(1973). The Lower Boundary Condition (LBC) was first investigated by Merton (1973) who 
tested this condition on European call options traded on individual stocks. However, this 
conditional test remained exclusive to European calls until Galai (1978) who modified it to 
accommodate American calls.  The LBC is a weaker form of test for cross-market efficiency 
compared to the PCP and the occurrence of violations only supports the weak form of market 
inefficiency but does not indicate any higher form of market inefficiency as tested by PCP. 
The majority of empirical tests on the LBC have investigated the US markets such as Galai 
(1978), Bhattacharya (1983), Figlewski (1989), and Evnine and Rudd (1985). In addition, 
several studies have been conducted on European markets. The majority of these papers 
resonate with studies on the American market showing that a significant number of violations 
are reported while testing the LBC. The main studies are Trautmann (1985) on the German 
market, the DAX, Puttonen (1993) on the Finnish market and Chesney et al. (1995) on the 
Swiss market. However, the numbers of these mispricings were reduced remarkably when 
transaction costs are taken into account.  
Put-Call parity was first outlined in the seminal paper of Stoll (1969) in which he found a 
relationship between the prices of a Call and its equivalent Put - traded on the same 
underlying asset with the same strike and expiration date, and that this relationship must hold 
in order to avoid any risk-free profit. The concept of the PCP was modified and extended 
from its basic form by Merton (1973) which provided an inequality formula for American 
options. Furthermore, Klemkosky and Resnick (1992) and Cox et al. (1979) studied the effect 
of dividend payments on the PCP for both European and American options. Finally, Cusack 
(1997) incorporated different components of transaction costs such as Brokerage 
commissions, index trading fees, short selling, taxes and bid/ask spreads into the calculation 
of PCP.  
According to Fama (1970), market efficiency is based on the assumption that market 
prices fully incorporate expectations and information from all market participants. Three 
forms of market efficiency are commonly discussed in the literature known as the weak, 
semi-strong, and strong market efficiency. When ‘efficiency’ is mentioned in this study, it 
refers to the weak form of market efficiency since we consider the historical market prices of 
both options and their underlying index.  
The empirical literature on market efficiency indicates three distinctive ways to test the 
efficiency of the options market (Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 2001). The first approach 
is based on a time series study of the predictability of implied volatility and whether a 
profitable arbitrage could be generated by implying historical volatility or the GARCH model 
to delta-neutral volatility trading. The pioneering investigations in this field are Latane and 
Rendleman (1976); Whaley (1982); Day and Lewis (1992). The second approach consists of 
comparing observed options prices with estimated prices from theoretical options pricing 
models. This approach was developed by Cohen et al. (1972) and has been used in many 
subsequent studies (e.g. Black and Scholes (1973); Galai (1978); Finnerty (1978)). The 
previous two approaches are based on the principle of jointly testing the efficiency of the 
options market, the level of synchronisation between prices in the realised and estimated 
options markets and the validity of the theoretical option pricing models (Capelle-Blancard 
and Chaudhury, 2001) and they both share a major disadvantage concerning the estimation of 
the standard deviations of the underlying prices. This standard deviation is not observable in 
the market, and price volatility estimation needs to be done, a method which is intensively 
debated. The final approach examines the market prices of the options and their underlying 
and simply tests for any mispricing or violations in the no-arbitrage relationships. This 
approach avoids the dilemma of jointly testing the hypotheses of market efficiency and model 
specification. Moreover, it does not require any restrictions upon the stochastic process 
underlying the stock. The essential principle that lies behind the no-arbitrage pricing 
relationships is that the future cash flows from identical investment strategies should have the 
same price. Using this method eliminates dependency on any assumptions related to market 
price dynamics and traders' risk performances (Mittnik and Rieken, 2000b). In this paper, the 
third approach is used with a focus on cross-market efficiency tests. To implement this 
approach we apply two fundamental no-arbitrage strategies which are the lower boundary 
condition and the PCP condition.  
2.1.The lower boundary condition 
The basic principle of the lower boundary condition is that the price of an option can 
never be less than its intrinsic price. Therefore, under the assumptions of a frictionless 
market
2
, the market is considered to be efficient with respect to this condition at any time t if 
the following condition holds: 
               
                (1) 
Where (C) is the price of a European call option with an exercise price of (K), the time to 
maturity is (t), the index value is (   ), and (r) is the risk free rate. 
In case this condition is violated, arbitrageurs will be able to generate a riskless free profit 
by buying the call (   ), short selling the index (   ) and lending the amount (  
   ) at the 
risk free rate. This violation can lead to an immediate cash inflow of       
        . 
By holding this position till the option's maturity, two possibilities arise: 
a. If      , the call is exercised (     ) and the index is bought and returned to the 
owner       , and since the investment has grown to ( ), that leads to a cash flow equal 
to zero. 
b.  If        , the option will not be exercised and expires worthless (a value of zero), and 
the index is bought at the current price        .That leads to a profit of       . 
Therefore, since this strategy leads to a positive cash inflow at time   and a nonnegative 
payoff at time  , an exploitable arbitrage opportunity arises.  
On the other hand, the lower boundary condition for the European put option is: 
            
                (2) 
Another arbitrage strategy can be performed if a violation occurs for this condition. 
Borrowing (     ) at the risk free rate and buying the index and the put. This leads to an 
immediate cash inflow of              . Again, the terminal payoff depends on the 
status of the index price and whether it is higher or lower than the exercise price. If       , 
then the put is exercised         , the debt is repaid (  ) and the index is sold (   ) leading 
to a zero payoff. If      , the put will be worthless at expiration, the debt is paid (  ) and 
the index is sold       leading to a cash inflow of        . 
The testing of the lower boundary conditions was through implementing the following 
equations: 
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  e.g. no dividend payments on the underlying assets, the lending and borrowing rates are equal, no 
commission fees ...etc. 
  
         
           
           (3) 
  
                   
           (4) 
where   
  : Ex-post profits from call option;   
  : Ex-post profits from put option;   
  : 
Transaction costs for call options;   
  : Transaction costs for put options. 
 
2.2.Put-Call parity 
A theoretical relationship exists between the put price, call price and other relevant 
variables such as the exercise price, underlying price, time to maturity, and risk-free rate. 
When these variables are given for a certain put (call) price, there will exist a unique 
theoretical call (put) price. An arbitrage opportunity occurs when the realised put (call) price 
is different from its theoretical put (call) price. Therefore, a trader can profit by generating a 
riskless return. 
Consider the construction of a portfolio consisting of a European call option with an 
underlying asset and another portfolio consisting of an identical (same exercise price and 
maturity date) put option with the same underlying asset forming two sets of securities. If 
these two portfolios have the same payoffs then they must have the same value and the call 
(Put) option can be replicated by the combination of its identical put (call) with the same 
underlying asset. This relationship gives rise to the Put-Call parity condition for European 
options which states that at any time     the relationship below must hold: 
            
             (5) 
This equation clearly states that buying a call directly is equal to buying its synthetic 
call. That is, buying the identical put (  ) and the asset (  ) and borrowing (   
   ) at the 
same time using a risk free rate. There exist two scenarios for this equation. If       at 
maturity, the terminal call value will be     . On the other side of the equation, the put 
option will expire as worthless with a zero cash flow, liquidating the debt (  ) and selling 
the index (   ) will lead to the same cash flow of      . In contrast, if       the call will 
expires as worthless with a zero payoff while the put value will be      and liquidating the 
portfolio will result in      leading to the same payoff of the call. Therefore, a call can be 
replicated with its identical put at any time without any risk. 
The same situation can be conducted with respect to a ‘long’ put. This can be 
converted at any time into a call by buying a call (   ), lending (  
   ) and shorting the 
asset (  ). Again, the payoff of both portfolios at time   is identical, regardless of the asset 
value at maturity and whether it is higher or lower than the exercise price. 
However, in the case of options mispricing in the market, this equation will not hold. For 
example, if the call option is priced too high relative to its identical put price, the trader can 
exploit a riskless arbitrage by writing the overpriced call and simultaneously buying an 
underpriced synthetic call, generating an immediate cash inflow of             
    
   and zero payoff at maturity. This strategy is known as a conversion strategy. The opposite 
scenario is when the put is priced relatively higher than the call price (this will motivate 
traders to buy the underpriced call) and simultaneously writing a synthetic call, leading to an 
immediate cash flow of            
       and a zero payoff at maturity. This 
strategy is known as a reversal strategy. 
The option of choosing any of these strategies depends on whether the overpriced option 
is a call or a put. A conversion strategy is taken when the call is overvalued relative to the put 
price, leading to an immediate cash inflow and a zero cash at time T, according to the 
following formula: 
Long    X 
                       (6) 
In contrast, the reversal strategy is taken when the put is overpriced relative to the call price, 
leading to an immediate cash inflow and zero cash at time T, according to the following 
formula: 
Short    +         X 
                         (7) 
According to Jensen (1978) and Galai (1978), as long as there is no investor able to 
constantly make a risk-free profit after imposing all market restrictions such as taxes and 
transaction costs, this market is considered to be an efficient market. Under the framework of 
this statement, if at any point in time the PCP holds, more precisely, if both call and put 
options are accurately priced relative to each other, then the options market will be 
considered an efficient one. 
The FTSE/MIB index option is represented in index points with a notional value of 2.5 
Euros per each point, which means that if the index value is 25,000, each contract has an 
underlying value of 62,500 Euros. The mean (€) value of violations reported for call options 
is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for each LBC deviation and PCP 
deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each LBC deviation and PCP deviation is calculated as 
per equation (6) for each call and equation (7) for each put, multiplied by the monetary 
contract size of €2.5.   
2.3.Hypotheses  
Based on the theoretical foundations presented above, the following hypotheses are 
designed to be tested in order to draw conclusions related to the efficiency of the Italian index 
options market:  
   : There are no significant violations reported when testing the lower boundary condition.  
Failing to reject    implies that the Italian index options market is efficient. 
  : There are no significant violations reported when testing the put call parity relation. 
Failing to reject    implies that the market is efficient. 
  : The number of violations occurring in both "PCP and LBC" tests will be reduced through 
the implementation of transaction costs in each scenario. 
Testing these hypotheses confirms the importance of market frictions in determining the 
efficiency of the index options market. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.Market and contract specification 
This study is conducted on the Italian Derivatives market "IDEM", in particular, the 
FTSE/MIB option index. The FTSE/MIB is a portfolio that equally weights the performance 
of 40 Italian listed equities, which represent approximately 80% of the whole domestic 
market capitalisation. It is comprised of highly liquid, pioneering firms across diversified 
economic sectors by adhering to the Industry Classification benchmark (ICB) traded on the 
Borsa Italia (BIT) main equity market, after adjustments for rights issues, stock splits and so 
forth. The 10 economic sectors that underlie the FTSE/MIB are; Utilities, Financial, 
Healthcare, Consumer service, Oil & Gas, Industrials, Technology, consumer goods, 
Materials, and Telecommunications.  
The FTSE/MIB index option is based on European style options contracts which are 
exercisable only on their day of expiry. This index option is represented in index points with 
a notional value of 2.5 Euros per point, which means that if the index value is 25,000, each 
contract has an underlying value of 62,500 Euros. 
The expiration date for each option is the third Friday of the expiration month if the 
Exchange is open; otherwise, it is the previous day when the Exchange is open. At expiration 
in the money (ITM), options are automatically exercised. Everyday options with six different 
expiration dates are available: four quarterly ending in March, June, September, and 
December and the two nearest non-quarterly months. The strike prices of an option contract 
have integer multiples of 500 index points.  In each option series (calls and puts), at any 
given time, there are at least nine different strikes for each expiration, quoted as follows: one 
at the money, four in, and four out of the money. The contracts are cash settled by the Italian 
Clearing House, Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G), which also calculates and 
manages the margins.  
 
3.2.Data set 
Our sample is limited to option contracts traded on the FTSE/MIB option index during 
the period between 1st October 2007 and 31st December 2012. The data is extracted from the 
DataStream database resulting in a final sample of 61,030 pairs of matched call and put 
options. 
Three types of data are used to construct the market efficiency tests: (i) data associated 
with the underlying asset which consists of the daily closing prices of the FTSE/MIB index 
and its annual dividend yield; (ii) data associated with option contracts including option 
name, daily closing prices of both call and put options, strike prices, maturity dates, option 
types, deal dates and number of contracts; (iii) the risk-free rate of return defined as the 
monthly risk free interest rates which have been collected from the LIBOR website. 
In order to conduct this study we have to apply some filtering to the original dataset, 
therefore, a discussion of the following criteria will be further explained: 
3.2.1. Price synchronicity  
The high number of violations reported in some studies can be attributed to non-synchronous 
data. A number of studies have used weekly and even monthly closing prices, which leads to 
more violations compared to studies using high-frequency data. Recently, empirical 
researchers have improved their data set quality by using tick-by-tick data. In other words, 
matching call and put option contracts within a 15, 10, 5 or even 1-minute interval leading to 
a high level of synchronisation between the option prices and the underlying index. Among 
those studies, Cavallo and Mammola (2000) used intra-day quotes captured every 15 minutes 
and Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2001) used even higher frequency data captured every 
minute. It is worth noting that using a wider interval in the data set will permit use of a larger 
sample size. However, increasing the interval spread between prices to 30 minutes or 1-hour 
intervals will raise the chances of stale prices. 
Since this study will focus on the daily closing prices of the options and their underlying 
index, following the studies conducted by Ackert and Tian (2001) and Kamara and Miller 
(1995), we will retain only those pairs of put/call options traded on the same day then match 
each pair with the same day FTSE/MIB index quotation.  
In addition, to mitigate the bias arising from the non-synchronous trading between 
options and the index, at any given day, any option price (Call or Put) with a value of zero 
will be directly eliminated from our sample (Dixit et al., 2009). 
3.2.2. Maturity and strike matching 
The matching process is carried out as follows: First, each call is matched with a put that 
has been traded on the same day, if there is no match for the call in that day the call will be 
eliminated. Each of these pairs of call/put must have the same strike and maturity.  
3.2.3. Index adjustment for dividend 
When the asset underlying an option is a stock index, the PCP relation has to be 
adjusted for dividends paid on the relevant stocks during the lifetime of the option. There are 
two cases when accounting for the dividend payments. Firstly, the index may be a 
performance index, adjusted for dividend payments, e.g. the DAX index (Mittnik and Rieken, 
2000a). Secondly, if the index is a capitalised index and not a performance one, it is not 
adjusted for dividends and an estimation of the dividend payments should be applied. 
 Cavallo and Mammola (2000) used options with a maturity of one month, and during 
the life of these options they did not record any dividend payments on the underlying stocks 
since dividend payments occur after the expiration day of the option, so they do not affect the 
options with 1-month maturity used for the empirical tests. However, Capelle-Blancard and 
Chaudhury (2001) assumed that arbitrageurs know exactly the amount of dividends paid on 
the CAC40. 
Incorporating transaction costs and dividend payments in equation (3) in order to make the 
PCP as realistic and testable as possible leads to the following equations: 
                                      
                  (8) 
                             
                         (9)  
where    
       
 = bid/ask index price;        = ask call/put price;        = bid call/put 
price;   present value of the dividends paid on the index up to time T;     = call transaction 
costs;     = put transaction costs;     = index transaction costs;   = percentage of short 
sales allowed. 
Since the FTSE/MIB is not a performance index, an adjustment for dividends should be 
conducted. The dividend yield for an index is the total dividend amount for the index 
expressed as a percentage of the total market value of the constituents of that index. The 
following method used is determined by the source index agency in the (IDEM). 
     
        
 
 
        
 
 
                             (10) 
where     is the aggregate dividend yield on day t,    is the dividend per share on day t,    is 
the number of shares in issue on day t,    is the unadjusted share price on day t, and n is the of 
constituents in the index.  
By taking the weighted average of aggregated dividend yields for each day t which are 
derived from DATASTREAM, a percentage of (       ) will be used as the constant 
dividend yield, hence the price of the underlying index (    ) will be replaced by (   
   ) in 
this study. 
3.2.4. Risk-free rate 
Most studies conducted in the European markets rely on the interbank bid and offer rates 
(Mittnik and Rieken, 2000a) or on the interbank offer rate adjusted for bid/ask spread 
(Cavallo and Mammola, 2000). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the risk-free rate used 
in the PCP to test for arbitrage opportunities is also used in calculating the short selling costs 
in checking the short strategy. 
In line with studies such as Torricelli and Brunetti (2003) and Cavallo and Mammola 
(2000) the Euribor rate has also been used for 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 months in order to facilitate 
the comparability with other studies and because choosing another rate (e.g. IRS rate) will not 
materially affect the results.  
3.2.5. Estimation of transaction costs 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that a precise estimation of the accurate costs for different 
strategies is very challenging and sometimes might be impossible. However, it is very 
important to consider transaction costs when studying the efficiency of options markets. 
Transaction costs include several types of costs such as bid/ask spread, commission costs, 
clearing fees, short selling costs, etc. The main costs taken into account in the most recent 
studies are the bid/ask spread and the commission costs, whereas the other costs are estimated 
to be negligible and therefore eliminated from the study. 
The main papers studying efficiency in European markets such as Mittnik and Rieken 
(2000a); Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2001); Cavallo and Mammola (2000) state that 
arbitrage profits are eliminated when accounting for transaction costs in the arbitrage 
strategies. The main difficulties in calculating these costs is that they tend to vary over time, 
market liquidity (positive bid/ask spread vs. zero bid/ask spread), agent type (retail investors 
vs. market makers), depend on the strategy used (short vs. long) and the size of the 
transaction (Berkman, 1996; Torricelli and Brunetti, 2003). According to these difficulties, 
researchers make different assumptions regarding transaction costs. Some apply a single 
scenario for all costs (Mittnik and Rieken, 2000a) while others base their studies on multiple 
scenarios such as Cavallo and Mammola (2000) and Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury 
(2001). 
It should be noted that in general, bid/ask spreads are not readily available, however, 
they are observable. Therefore, most studies apply the estimation method based on a pre-
determined sample of bid/ask spread then assume this spread is constant over time (Stoll, 
1969; Phillips and Smith, 1980; Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 2001). On the other hand, 
commission costs are observable but difficult to set since they vary dramatically from one 
investor to another and depend on the size and credibility of the traders (Torricelli and 
Brunetti, 2003). 
This study will be following Torricelli and Brunetti (2003) in the estimations of 
transaction costs. In the period of this study, both Repo and Euribor’s interest rates are very 
similar and low. Therefore, short selling costs, which are affected mainly by the offer rates of 
the risk-free rate, are considered to be negligible. The same applies to the clearing fees in the 
Italian market (Cavallo and Mammola, 2000; Torricelli and Brunetti, 2003). Therefore, both 
short selling costs and clearing fees are eliminated and the main attention will be on the 
bid/ask spread and the commission costs. 
As mentioned before, commission costs are observable but difficult to set. This fact is 
particularly true in the Italian options market where trading is extremely diversified. The 
commission fees vary according to the type of arbitrageurs and the means of trade. For 
example, market makers making high numbers of transactions face very low commissions 
compared to a higher commission charged for retail investors making a lower number of 
transactions. 
In order to facilitate the implementation of PCP tests, an assumption that four 
different types of traders exist with four different commissions' levels will be introduced as 
follows: (i) high: equal to 40 Euros per option traded, representing retail investors who 
occasionally trade options; (ii) medium high: equal to 25 Euros per option traded, 
representing retail investors who trade online; (iii) medium low: equal to 10 Euros per option 
traded, representing professional investors with low volume of transactions or active retail 
investors; (iv) minimum: equal to 1 Euro per option traded, representing arbitrageurs who 
realise high volume of transactions. 
For the period under investigation, unfortunately, bid/ask prices for both options and 
the underlying index are not readily available. Therefore, an estimation process will be 
conducted. For the option spread quotation, if the bid/ask spread for a certain period is not 
available, an estimation of the average bid/ask spread can be made based on the bid/ask 
quotations for another sample in another time period. Then, the average derived will be 
assumed as a constant number during the period studied (Phillips & Smith, 1980). This 
method is widely used in the recent literature (Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 
2001; Torricelli and Brunetti, 2003) and will be used in this study. 
Using the daily bid and ask quotations for the FTSE/MIB options available on Yahoo 
Finance for the whole sample period, resulted in a value of 0.879 (1.104) of the trading price, 
as the mean bid (ask) price. These numbers multiplied by the daily closing prices, provides an 
estimation of the bid/ask option quotations. Despite the bias that may occur using this 
method, there are two supportive arguments for the choice of this bid/ask spread. First, the 
results derived are in line with the asymmetry of bid/ask spread, as described in Nordén 
(2003) and Chan and Chung (2012). Second, the spread obtained falls within the maximum 
and minimum bounds allowed, imposed by the Boras Italia on the market makers. Regarding 
the FTSE/MIB bid/ask quotations they are considered as negligible and therefore ignored in 
this study, following the assumptions of Torricelli and Brunetti (2003).  
 
4.  Results 
This section presents the impact of arbitrage profitability on the efficiency of Italian 
option index FTSE/MIB by using the LBC and PCP for the period between the 1
st
 October 
2007 to the 31
st
 December 2012. The sample period is then divided into the crisis period from 
1
st
 October 2007 to 31
st
 December 2009 and the post crisis period from 1
st
 January 2010 to 
31
st
 December 2012. For each test, the analysis is divided into three different scenarios to 
better emphasise the role of transaction costs in determining the number of violations. The 
first scenario (scenario A) excludes transaction costs and the bid/ask spread. The second 
scenario (scenario B) includes only the bid/ask spread. The third scenario (scenario C) 
includes transaction costs (both bid/ask spreads and commission levels).      
4.1. Lower boundary condition test 
4.1.1. Scenario A 
This is a preliminary scenario where the mispricing of options is tested without the 
implementation of transaction costs in the dataset. The first set of results are presented in 
Table 1, which shows that the number of violations in call prices are 1,323 (5.28% out of 
25,044) for the crisis period then it drops during the post crisis period to 492 (1.37% out of 
35,986) indicating a higher efficiency in pricing these options. The total call violations for the 
whole sample are 1,815 (2.97% out of 60,030). On the other hand, the frequency of put 
violations shows more dramatic mispricing with a total number of 5,496 (8.83%) for the 
whole sample, which is more than triple that of the call options, 2,623 (10.47 %) violations 
occurred during the crisis period and 2,873 violations during the post crisis period; however, 
the overall percentage of violations during the post crisis period is lower than the crisis period 
(7.69%). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
These results indicate that arbitrageurs can profit from the mispricing of both call and 
put options to create synthetic portfolios and generate risk free profits, especially from put 
options that have a higher percentage of mispricing. Despite the relatively high percentage of 
violations in both call and put options the size of mispricing is low with a mean of 58.05 and 
64.05 Euros for the whole sample of call and put options, respectively. 
4.1.2. Scenario B and C 
In these scenarios both bid/ask spread and transaction costs are taken into account. In 
Table 2, the test results are presented for both calls and puts, covering the four suggested 
commission levels. 
The effect of transaction costs implementation is to cause an enormous decrease in the 
number of violations. For both cases (calls and puts) the percentage of violations are no more 
than 1.5% of the total observations. In addition, there are only moderate differences in the 
number of violations between the four commission levels for both calls and puts across the 
six years. Furthermore, the numbers of violations recorded for put options for all the 
commission levels in the whole sample are higher than that of call options, indicating that put 
options are more exposed to violations than call options. Regarding the size of violations, the 
mean value is relatively small, below 200 Euros in all the observations. However, the mean 
value is higher for this scenario (with high transaction costs) where the mean of the whole 
sample is 60.5 (87.17) Euros for calls (puts) compared to that of scenario A with only 58.05 
(64.05) Euros. On the other hand, the maximum values of exploitable profits have decreased 
substantially relative to scenario A. These results can be explained by the inclusion of 
transaction costs that lead to the elimination of the majority of small profits, leaving only the 
high profit opportunities exploitable and at the same time reducing their values. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
To conclude, it is clearly observed that the inclusion of transaction prices into the 
LBC test has severely decreased the exploitable arbitrage opportunities resulting in a 
negligible number of violations. Therefore, it can be said that the Italian options market is 
efficient with regard to the LBC test.  
 
 
4.2. PCP Ex-post tests  
4.2.1. Scenario A 
Tables 3 and 4 contain the ex-post test results with no bid/ask spread or transaction 
costs. In the analysis of this scenario, the focus will be on following points: 
Firstly, due to the intrinsic nature of the strategies both long and short strategies are 
perfectly symmetrical and the numbers of profitable short strategies must be exactly identical 
to the number of non-profitable long ones. Therefore, only results with positive profits are 
reported. Secondly, as shown in Table 3, the short strategy is more profitable relative to the 
long one during all periods. In addition, the percentage of PCP violations to the whole 
violations in each year has experienced a dramatic decrease from the crisis period to the post-
crisis period. The year 2007 had 49.47% (56.97) long (short) violations which dropped to 
15.42% (19.31%) for long (short) violations in 2012. 
The long and short strategies reported in Table 3 for the whole sample indicate a total 
number of violations of 15,083 (24.71% out of 61,030) and 23,641 (38.74% out of 21,470) 
respectively. 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
Even though the percentage of violations is quite high, that does not indicate the inefficiency 
of the Italian market since the transaction costs are not yet taken into account. 
Finally, as can be derived from Table 4, despite the high frequency of violations, 
91.12% and 87.53% of the total number of violations for long and short strategies, 
respectively have a profitability of below 200 Euros. However, some observations have 
profits above 200 Euros, including some exceptional cases where the maximum profits are 
1629.15 and 1890.79, for long and short, respectively. For the whole sample of violations, the 
mean values are 373.99 Euros and 463.96 Euros for long and short strategies respectively 
which show that short strategies are more profitable than long ones. Furthermore, the mean 
Euro values of these violations are reduced during the post crisis period compared to the 
crisis period indicating better market efficiency after the crisis period.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2. Scenario B 
In this scenario, the bid/ask spread, which is the most important part of the transaction 
costs (Demsetz, 1968), is included in the figures. Given that the index’s bid/ask spread is 
negligible, only the bid/ask spreads for option prices are considered.  
In this regard, the results are summarised in Tables 5 and 6. It should be noted that 
both positive and negative mispricings are reported in Table 5 because the symmetrical 
behaviour of both strategies no longer exists; this is due to the asymmetric nature of the 
bid/ask spreads included. In table 5, the number of violations reported shows a dramatic 
decrease in exploitable opportunities, compared to scenario A, dropping from 15038 
(24.71%) and 23641 (38.74%) to 2223 (3.64%) and 3254 (5.33%) for long and short 
strategies, respectively. The percentage of violations reported experienced a gradual decline 
throughout the sample period for both strategies. For the long strategy the percentage of 
violations dropped from 6.6% in 2007 to 2.03% in 2012. Similarly, there was a drop for the 
percentage of violations for the short strategy from 8.76% in 2007 to 3.7% in 2012. 
In line with the findings in scenario A, a short strategy is still more profitable than a 
long one during all periods because the option prices are, on average, closer to the bid than 
the ask spread and it can be seen that the sample contains more ‘in the money put options’ 
than ‘in the money call options’.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 6 reports the size of the profits from the violations incurred for this scenario. 
Similarly to the previous findings reported in table 4, the majority of violations are still less 
than 200 Euros. For both long and short strategies the post crisis period experienced a decline 
in the average monetary value of violations compared to the crisis period. In addition, the 
whole sample mean values for both long and short strategies have decreased in this scenario 
compared to the findings in scenario A.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.3. Scenario C 
In this scenario all transaction costs are included (bid/ask spread and commission fees 
represented by four different levels as discussed earlier).  
The results obtained from this scenario reflect the most realistic numbers of arbitrage 
opportunities available for the market investors since all the costs that can minimise the 
chances of risk-free profits are included.  
Tables 7 and 8 present the frequency and size of violations during the sample period 
for both strategies. In Table 7, it is clear that the level of violations is reduced as the 
commission costs increase. In addition, it can be observed that the percentage of violations 
for the long strategy decreases significantly to range from 2072 (3.42%) to 966 (1.58%) 
according to investor type, for the whole sample, compared to (3.64%) in scenario B and 
(24.71%) in scenario A. 
On the other hand, the level of violations in the short strategy are higher than those in 
the long strategy, ranging from 2961 (4.85%) to 1568 (2.57%) for the whole sample. 
However, these are still lower compared to (5.33%) in scenario B and (38.74%) in scenario 
A. 
This huge reduction in the frequency of violations, starting with the implementation 
of the bid/ask spread, followed by the inclusion of transaction costs, reflects the importance 
of considering these costs when investigating PCP. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 8 shows the level of profits for the violations reported in this scenario. For the 
long strategy, it can be noted that in addition to the decrease of the number of violations from 
the crisis period to the post crisis period, the profits of these violations has declined as well. 
The minimum (maximum) profits during the crisis period with maximum and minimum 
commission levels were 176.64 (687.54) and 111.73 (1421.31) dropping to 213.64 (334.73) 
and 5.94 (1267.9) during the post crisis period indicating a better market efficiency. 
However, the situation is different for the short strategy. First, the mean monetary value of 
violations is higher than the reported means of the long strategy during both periods (except 
for the crisis period with maximum commission level and post-crisis period with medium low 
commission level). Second, a comparison between the means during the crisis and post crisis 
periods shows conflicting findings across the different commission levels.  For example, 
despite the lower number of violations during the post crisis period compared to the crisis 
one, the means for medium low (394.67), medium high (409.53), and maximum (425.34) 
commission levels are higher than the values during the crisis period with (356.79), (384.3), 
and (219.93), respectively.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 To conclude, throughout the results obtained in each of the three scenarios, it is clear 
that the role of bid/ask spread and transaction costs are very important in determining the true 
level of market efficiency. Furthermore, the results reported in the last scenario together with 
the findings from the LBC tests show that the cross-market efficiency in the Italian index 
options market is substantial.   
4.3. PCP Ex-ante test 
Ex-post tests make the assumption that an arbitrageur creates a position (short or long) 
at prices prevailing at the same instant that the arbitrage opportunity exists (Klemkosky and 
Resnick, 1979). In other words, ex-post tests assume the ability to simultaneously execute 
trades to create arbitrage profits the instant they occur, which is practically unrealistic. Ex-
post tests are unable to respond to the question of how fast mispriced option prices are 
adjusted by market forces. Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2001), Ackert and Tian (2001), 
and Mittnik and Rieken (2000a) emphasise the important use of Ex-ante tests as an essential 
measure of how long the detected arbitrage persists to be exploited by investors or corrected 
by market forces. In order to establish an Ex-ante test, a time lag needs to be identified to 
eliminate the arbitrage opportunities. 
The procedure of an Ex-ante test with a lag of h (could be seconds, minutes, days) can 
be explained as follows: For each Ex-post pair of options indicating a profitable trade, a 
scanning process for the whole sample is conducted to allocate a profitably matched pair 
available at the time (h). If no matched pair can be found in the sample within the next 
predefined execution lag, then the Ex-post profitable options pair will be excluded. In 
contrast, if a matched pair is found, the Ex-post options pair will be included in the sample, 
the profit or loss realised will be calculated using the new option prices and index level at lag 
(h). 
Since the time lagged set of matched pairs might not be available for each violation, it should 
be noted that it is not necessary for the number of Ex-ante observations to match with that of 
Ex-post observations (Lee and Nayar, 1993). In addition, a major difference between Ex-post 
and Ex-ante tests is that the Ex-ante tests are not riskless arbitrage tests. Due to the 
movements in market prices, execution of arbitrage opportunities might cause a loss rather 
than a profit (Li, 2006). Therefore, the Ex-ante observations will be defined as the total 
number of potential arbitrage opportunities that exist for the predefined execution lag, 
whereas the Ex-ante violations will be limited to the profitable ones only. The length of the 
execution lag depends on the study. For example, Mittnik and Rieken (2000a) and Li (2006) 
took multiple lags, ranging from 1 minute to 1 day, whereas Capelle-Blancard and 
Chaudhury (2001) took a 15-minute lag. 
Ex-ante tests are another way to prove the efficiency of the Italian index options 
market and they can incorporate a parameter to test for the robustness of the ex-post tests 
carried out previously. So far, the ex-post tests applied can be used as an indication of any 
instantaneous possibility of exploitable arbitrage opportunities in the index options market. 
On the other hand, ex-ante tests indicate to what extent realising these opportunities, is 
possible. In testing the three scenarios with the ex-ante tests two key statistics have been 
calculated, known as percentage ( ) and percentage ( );  
                                                   (11) 
                                                   (12) 
4.3.1. Scenario A 
As previously explained in this scenario, no transaction costs are taken into account. 
Table 9 reports the arbitrage violations for both percentages a and b. Regarding percentage 
( ) the number of violations has dropped significantly to less than half of the numbers 
reported earlier. More precisely, the possibilities of any arbitrage opportunities while 
imposing a lag period of one day are reduced by more than one half. The potentially 
exploitable profit opportunities from the long (short) arbitrage strategies for the whole period 
dropped to 10.57% (16.63%). Similarly, percentage ( ) reveals a slightly higher percentage 
of violations with 12.83% (20.18%) for long and short strategies – this slight increase is 
because of the small difference between the ex-ante and total number of observations. 
Furthermore, the percentages of ( ) and ( ) for both strategies declined substantially from 
2007 to 2012 indicating a decrease of arbitrage opportunities throughout the years and 
especially during the post crisis period. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
4.3.2. Scenarios B and C 
As anticipated when testing the ex-ante violations while accounting for the bid/ask 
spread and the commission costs, the number of these violations are further reduced. Table 10 
reports the number of instances of mispricing for both scenarios B and C. In scenario B, 
percentage (a) has been reduced to 3.60 (4.79%) for the long (short) strategy, while 
percentage (b) becomes 21.88% (29.07%) for the long (short) strategy. However, in scenario 
C, for percentage (a) the violations dropped significantly to range from 2.71% (4.03%) for 
arbitrageurs to 0.09% (0.15%) for retail investors in the long (short) strategy. On the other 
hand, for percentage (b) the test showed a higher number of violations for arbitrageurs with 
16.47(24.49%) in the long (short) strategy to 0.56% (0.92%) in the long (short) strategy for 
retail investors. Therefore, it can be said that the results reported in Tables 9 and 10, for ex-
ante tests are additional proof of the validation of the efficiency results reported earlier using 
the ex-post tests. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides a fundamental test of the cross-market efficiency of the Italian 
FTSE/MIB index options contracts during the period from 1st October 2007 to 31st 
December 2012 which includes the period of the financial crisis. The investigation of any 
pricing violations is conducted using the arbitrage pricing relationships between the options 
and their underlying index, to be more precise, by testing the cross market efficiency with 
two fundamental conditions: the lower boundary condition and the PCP condition. 
There are several factors that influenced the decision to test the Italian index options 
market. First, the limited number of studies conducted on this market. Second, the fact that 
the two main studies on this market, Cavallo and Mammola (2000) and Torricelli and 
Brunetti (2003) are relatively old, which makes it interesting to test the efficiency of this 
market with respect to a new set of data, taking into account the introduction of the Euro and 
the impact of the recent financial crisis on this market and whether the market efficiency 
hypothesis holds during the period of crisis and how it compares with the post crisis period. 
Third, it is important to consider the effect of the new rules applied to this market. 
In this study, daily options' prices have been used, allowing for put and call pairs to be 
matched within a one-day interval. After applying various filtering criteria, our sample 
includes 61,030 pairs of matched call and put options. 
 A number of empirical tests are used in order to analyse different points. First, ex-post 
results for both lower boundary conditions and PCP are tested without the inclusion of any 
market frictions. Then the bid/ask spreads for option prices are included, followed by the 
inclusion of commission fees. Then, ex-ante tests are conducted in order to verify the 
robustness of the ex-post results.  
With respect to the Lower Boundary Conditions in the first scenario, where no market 
frictions were considered, the frequency of violations showed a relatively high percentage of 
mispricing of 2.97% (8.83%) for calls and puts, respectively. The percentage of mispricing in 
the crisis period was substantially more than in the post crisis period.  When both bid/ask 
spreads and transaction costs were considered, the percentages dropped significantly to 
between 0.41% and 0.14% (between 0.74% and 0.37%) with minimum to high commission 
levels.. Furthermore, the mean value of violations was moderate and did not exceed 200 
Euros for the whole sample. There was somewhat higher percentage of violations in the crisis 
but they were still at a low level. In addition, it can be stated that throughout the whole period 
in all the scenarios, the put options violated the lower boundary condition more often than the 
calls. These results support market efficiency concerning the lower boundary conditions and 
therefore, the first hypothesis is confirmed. 
With respect to PCP, once the bid/ask spread is included; the frequency of violations 
decreased severely from 24.71% (38.74%) to 3.64% (5.33%) for the long and short strategies, 
respectively. In this study, four different scenarios were established for estimation of 
commissions according to trader type, with the highest commission being applied to retail 
investors and the lowest to arbitrageurs. When these commissions were accounted for, the 
percentage of violations dropped further to 3.42% (1.58%) for the long strategy applied by 
arbitrageurs (retail investors). For the short strategy, the percentage was 4.85% (2.57%) for 
arbitrageurs (retail investors). As for the LBC tests the percentage of violations was 
somewhat higher during the crisis period.  Furthermore, it can be noted that during the first 
two scenarios, a short strategy was more profitable than a long one. This can be related to put 
options being overpriced relative to calls. These findings are quite different from the study 
conducted by Torricelli and Brunetti (2003) perhaps due to a recent rule partially limiting 
short selling in the Italian index market.  
Even though we report a higher frequency of violations than other studies, it can be said 
that the Italian options market is weakly efficient since the higher percentages can be related 
to the use of daily data instead of the high-frequency data used in previous studies. 
In order to check the robustness of the results reported for the PCP tests and to find 
out to what extent the ex-post arbitrage opportunities can be exploited, ex-ante tests were 
carried out. Results showed that the incidences of PCP violations dropped considerably, even 
in the absence of transaction costs, to 10.57% (16.63%) for the long (short) strategy. When 
transaction costs are included, the percentage of violations decreased even more so as to be 
almost negligible for retail investors with 0.56% (0.92%) for the long (short) strategy. These 
findings are in line with the results reported in Torricelli and Brunetti (2003) study. To 
conclude, it can be said that the Italian index options market was broadly efficient throughout 
the sample period studied and there is some indication that the market has become even more 
efficient since the financial crisis.  
The efficiency analysis performed in this paper can be extended in two main 
directions: (i) in this paper, the main focus was on giving an overview of the frequency and 
level of violations in determining market efficiency through testing the relationship between 
exploitable arbitrage opportunities and the arbitrage strategies (short vs. long). Therefore, this 
study can be extended to test the relationships between arbitrage profitability and other 
factors such as the moneyness (in the money, out of the money, at the money) of options and 
the maturity of options. (ii) the market efficiency in this paper was tested by applying cross-
market efficiency tests (Lower boundary condition and PCP) further options market 
efficiency tests can be conducted such as call and put spreads, box spreads and put/call 
convexities (butterfly spreads). 
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Table 1: Violations of the lower boundary conditions, scenario A (No trading costs) 
Period 
Call Put 
Violations Percentage  Mean  Min. Max. Violations Percentage Mean Min. Max. 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 
2007 
243 13.39% 67.22 0.05 714.28 219 4.06% 78.34 0.7 437.99 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 
2008 
963 53.06% 44.98 0.05 622.79 808 14.99% 55.85 0.03 623.67 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 
2009 
117 6.45% 72.51 0.12 484.1 1596 29.60% 73.31 0.2 539.61 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 
2010 
182 10.03% 55.36 0.03 567.21 1267 21.57% 54.02 0.07 700.24 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 
2011 
176 9.70% 61.99 0.07 534.36 792 14.69% 66.39 0.05 433.88 
1st  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 
2012 
134 7.38% 58.46 0.01 444.72 814 15.10% 56.56 0.01 510.07 
Crisis period 1323 5.28% 62.54 0.05 714.28 2623 10.47% 67.11 0.7 623.67 
Post crisis period 492 1.37% 57.55 0.01 567.21 2873 7.69% 59.75 0.01 700.24 
Whole Sample 1815 2.97% 58.05 0.01 714.28 5496 8.83% 64.05 0.01 700.24 
The table reports for each period and for the whole sample the number of call and put options that violate the lower boundary condition, the percentage of these violations 
over the subsamples' periods and descriptive statistics for the mean, minimum, and maximum value of violations reported in Euro. The mean (€) value of violations reported 
for call options is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for each LBC deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each LBC deviation is calculated as per equation (3) 
for calls and equation (4) for puts, multiplied by the monetary contract size €2.5. 
Table 2: Violations of the lower boundary conditions , Scenario B and C (Incorporating bid/ask spreads and transaction costs) 
Period Commission levels 
Call Put 
Violations Percentage mean Min Max Violations Percentage mean Min Max 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 
2007 
Minimum 28 0.78% 62.72 1.99 651.24 31 0.87% 68.23 3.66 408.64 
Medium low 22 0.62% 58 2.22 623.11 23 0.64% 57.88 3.22 400.64 
Medium High 17 0.48% 53.11 2.47 573.64 15 0.42% 61.06 2.98 387.99 
High 13 0.36% 46.93 3.37 546.91 7 0.20% 59.11 2.41 331.61 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 
2008 
Minimum 143 1.26% 92.80 0.07 507 108 0.95% 175.53 7.15 612.09 
Medium low 115 1.02% 97.66 1.12 497 99 0.87% 166.49 6.70 602.09 
Medium High 48 0.42% 101.25 2.27 472 79 0.70% 169.86 6.20 577.09 
High 35 0.31% 114 19.30 432 69 0.61% 159.62 1.01 537.09 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 
2009 
Minimum 10 0.10% 89.11 1.74 359.40 46 0.45% 154.43 0.49 494.70 
Medium low 10 0.10% 76.11 4.13 349.40 45 0.44% 152.71 1.94 484.70 
Medium High 8 0.08% 75.78 16.74 324.40 37 0.36% 134.00 2.25 459.70 
High 8 0.08% 71.78 29.13 284.40 35 0.34% 126.16 6.19 419.70 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 
2010 
Minimum 18 0.14% 44.64 0.33 487.64 120 0.95% 78.66 4.22 632.33 
Medium low 15 0.12% 49.06 0.89 411.72 66 0.52% 69.2 5.11 622.76 
Medium High 15 0.12% 38.22 1.69 410 48 0.38% 51 5.55 598.34 
High 14 0.11% 52.88 2.46 396.33 43 0.34% 67.58 7.62 577.48 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 
2011 
Minimum 13 0.11% 53.76 0.1 477.77 71 0.62% 53.91 0.9 410.34 
Medium low 11 0.08% 55.08 0.93 423.62 59 0.51% 51.08 4.07 397.46 
Medium High 9 0.08% 45.81 1.97 399.05 42 0.37% 62.47 5.16 394.06 
High 6 0.05% 41.22 2.08 389.36 35 0.31% 58.89 8.43 380 
1st  Jan 2012– 31st Dec 
2012 
Minimum 21 0.18% 56.95 0.09 412.35 49 0.41% 61.66 1.19 499.14 
Medium low 15 0.13% 51.64 2.19 391.61 42 0.35% 67.91 3.54 486.31 
Medium High 7 0.06% 48.82 2.47 366.72 31 0.26% 42.1 5.91 477.71 
High 7 0.06% 39.2 3.16 321.11 24 0.20% 54.65 7.62 380.93 
Whole Sample 
Minimum 233 0.41% 66 0.07 651.24 425 0.74% 95.16 0.49 632.33 
Medium low 188 0.33% 64.3 0.09 623.11 334 0.58% 93.66 1.01 622.76 
Medium High 104 0.18% 60 0.33 573.64 252 0.44% 86.5 1.94 598.34 
High 83 0.14% 60.5 2.08 546.91 213 0.37% 87.17 2.25 577.48 
The table reports the number of call and put options that violate the lower boundary condition including transaction costs divided over the different commission levels, the percentage of these violations over the subsamples' 
periods and descriptive statistics for the mean, minimum, and maximum value of violations reported in Euro. The mean (€) value of violations reported for call options is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for 
each LBC deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each LBC deviation is calculated as per equation (3) for each call and equation (4) for each put, multiplied by monetory contract size €2.5. 
  
  
Table 3: Frequency of PCP violations , scenario A (No trading costs) 
Period  
Strategy 
Long Short 
1
st
  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 2007 1768 (49.47%) 2036 (56.97%) 
1
st
  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 2008 4416 ( 39.02% ) 6902 ( 60.98% ) 
1
st
  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 2009 2982 ( 29.37% ) 7170 ( 70.63% ) 
1
st
  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 2010 1945 (15.38%) 2697 (21.32%) 
1
st
  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 2011 2136 (18.68%) 2537 (22.19%) 
1
st
  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 2012 1836 (15.42%) 2299 (19.31%) 
Whole Sample 15083 ( 24.71% ) 23641 ( 38.74% )  
The table reports the number and the percentage of PCP violations registered for each period and over the whole sample. No cases found of perfectly null profit. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the profit of long and short strategies, scenario A (No trading costs) 
    
Profit Range 
Long Short 
Mean Max Min Obs. Percentage Mean Max Min obs. Percentage 
Crisis period Included observations : 9166 Included observations : 16108 
[ 0 , 200 ) 95.64 199.01 0.01 8358 91.18% 126.61 197.22 0.01 13533 84.01% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 251.67 397.31 200.49 564 6.15% 276.91 391.34 204.23 2155 13.38% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 484.66 576.86 403.74 134 1.46% 509.61 583.6 407.41 309 1.92% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 691.3 789.73 607.64 78 0.85% 679.53 786.63 610.66 83 0.52% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 820.69 887.36 812.25 25 0.27% 913.15 999.14 810.33 23 0.14% 
[ 1000 , 1900 1483.16 1629.15 1318.00 7 0.08% 1817.62 1890.79 1725.69 5 0.03% 
All 391.64 1629.15 0.01 9166 100% 473.64 1890.79 0.01 16108 100% 
Post crisis period Included observations : 5917 Included observations : 7533 
[ 0 , 200 ) 87.03 185.64 0.01 5386 91.03% 93.12 173.36 0.03 6934 92.05% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 220.33 365.13 200.47 243 4.11% 210.33 350.31 200.1 339 4.50% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 420 490.66 410.23 196 3.31% 527.68 589.13 433.78 193 2.56% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 638.66 718.94 600.31 66 1.12% 672.36 798.31 601.31 46 0.61% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 836.88 873.36 829.13 22 0.37% 897.15 966.47 870.66 13 0.17% 
[ 1000 , 1900 1240.99 1467.94 1010.36 4 0.07% 1652.37 1873.68 1567.98 8 0.11% 
All 363.5 1467.94 0.01 5917 100% 426.16 1873.68 0.03 7533 100% 
Whole sample Included observations : 15083 Included observations : 23641 
[ 0 , 200 ) 93.13 199.01 0.01 13744 91.12% 118.36 197.22 0.01 20693 87.53% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 248.66 397.31 200.47 807 5.35% 260.16 391.34 200.1 2494 10.55% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 440.67 576.86 403.74 330 2.19% 515.36 589.13 407.41 276 1.17% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 673.96 789.73 600.31 144 0.95% 675.67 798.31 601.31 129 0.55% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 826.14 887.36 812.25 47 0.31% 909.36 999.14 810.33 36 0.15% 
[ 1000 , 1900 1386.36 1629.15 1010.36 11 0.07% 1713.94 1890.79 1567.98 13 0.05% 
All 373.99 1629.15 0.01 15083 100.00 463.96 1890.79 0.01 23641 100.00 
This table reports for each strategy (long and short) and each profit range: the mean, maximum, minimum, number of observations and percentage of the profit range over the whole sample. The mean (€) value of 
violations reported for call options is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation is calculated as per equation (6) for each call and 
equation (7) for each put, multiplied by monetory contract size €2.5. 
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Table 5: Frequency of PCP violations in scenario B (Incorporating bid/ask spread) 
Strategy Profits 
1
st
  Oct 2007 – 
31
st
 Dec 2007 
1
st
  Jan 2008 – 
31
st
 Dec 2008 
1
st
  Jan 2009 – 
31
st
 Dec 2009 
1
st
  Jan 2010 – 
31
st
 Dec 2010 
1
st
  Jan 2011 – 
31
st
 Dec 2011 
1
st
  Jan 2012 – 
31
st
 Dec 2012 
Whole Sample 
Long 
Negative 
3338 10681 9698 12363 11064 11663 58807 
93.4% 94.38% 95.53% 97.75% 96.77% 97.97% 96.36% 
Positive 
236 637 454 285 369 242 2223 
6.6% 5.62% 4.47% 2.25% 3.23% 2.03% 3.64% 
Total 
3574 11318 10152 12648 11433 11905 61030 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Short 
Negative 
3261 10323 9440 12328 10960 11464 57776 
91.24% 91.20% 92.99% 97.47% 95.86% 96.3% 94.67% 
Positive 
313 995 712 320 473 441 3254 
8.76% 8.79% 7.01% 2.53% 4.14% 3.7% 5.33% 
Total 
3574 11318 10152 12648 11433 11905 61030 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
The table reports the number and the percentage of PCP violations under scenario B where bid/ask spreads are included for each period and over the whole sample. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for long and short strategies profits, scenario B (Incorporating bid/ask spread) 
Profit Range 
Long Short 
Mean Max Min Obs. % Mean Max Min obs. % 
Crisis period Included observations : 1327 Included observations : 2020 
[ 0 , 200 ) 117.63 191.20 0.02 1158 87.26% 126.94 181.28 0.04 1896 93.86% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 281.35 391.56 209.85 103 7.76% 223.63 368.22 209.45 89 4.41% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 503.64 541.00 407.22 36 2.71% 473.21 569.15 421.71 24 1.19% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 687.44 777.65 625.12 16 1.21% 657.36 755.55 609.42 10 0.50% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 848.54 867.51 831.21 13 0.98% 0 0 0 0 0% 
[ 1000 , 1600 ) 1421.31 1421.31 1421.31 1 0.08% 1582.00 1582.00 1582.00 1 0.05% 
All 260.17 1421.31 0.02 1327 100% 293.16 1582.00 0.04 2020 100% 
Post crisis Included observations : 896 Included observations : 1234 
[ 0 , 200 ) 92.64 185.64 0.01 673 75.11% 123.64 173.36 5.6 926 75.04% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 243.89 365.13 200.47 143 15.96% 306.99 350.31 269 214 17.34% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 431.61 483.69 412.46 46 5.13% 531.03 576.94 433.78 54 4.38% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 627.94 698.61 613.33 23 2.57% 669.04 746.64 620.72 26 2.11% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 847.64 873.36 829.13 10 1.12% 847.61 920.1 870.66 9 0.73% 
[ 1000 , 1600 ) 1267.9 1267.9 1267.9 1 0.11% 1473.64 1657.5 1567.98 5 0.41% 
All 248.61 1267.9 0.01 896 100% 253.96 1657.5 5.6 1234 100% 
Whole sample Included observations : 2223 Included observations : 3254 
[ 0 , 200 ) 103.76 191.2 0.01 1831 82.37% 125.62 181.28 0.04 2822 86.72% 
[ 200 , 400 ) 253.14 391.56 200.47 246 11.07% 278.56 368.22 209.45 303 9.31% 
[ 400 , 600 ) 461.9 541 407.22 82 3.69% 506.32 576.94 421.71 78 2.40% 
[ 600 , 800 ) 662.28 777.65 613.33 39 1.75% 660.37 755.55 609.42 36 1.11% 
[ 800, 1000 ) 848.01 873.36 829.13 23 1.03% 847.61 920.1 870.66 9 0.28% 
[ 1000 , 1600 ) 1344.61 1421.31 1267.9 2 0.09% 1502.36 1657.5 1567.98 6 0.18% 
All 256.61 1421.31 0.01 2223 100% 279.41 1657.5 0.04 3254 100% 
This table reports for each strategy (long and short) and each profit range: the mean, the maximum, the minimum, the number of observations and the percentage of the profit range over the whole sample. The mean 
(€) value of violations reported for call options is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation is calculated as per equation (6) for each 
call and equation (7) for each put, multiplied by monetory contract size €2.5. 
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Table 7: Frequency of PCP violations in scenario C (Incorporating bid/ask spread and commission fees) 
Strategy Period 
Commission levels 
Minimum Medium low Medium high Maximum 
Long 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 2007 
213 164 143 97 
5.96% 4.59% 4% 2.71% 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 2008 
629 492 309 215 
5.56% 4.35% 2.73% 1.90% 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 2009 
443 370 248 200 
4.36% 3.64% 2.44% 1.97% 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 2010 
271 220 181 133 
2.14% 1.74% 1.43% 1.05% 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 2011 
316 308 224 175 
2.76% 2.69% 1.96% 1.53% 
1st  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 2012 
200 183 161 146 
1.68% 1.54% 1.35% 1.23% 
Whole Sample 
2072 1737 1266 966 
3.42% 2.85% 2.07% 1.58% 
Short 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 2007 
246 181 163 117 
6.88% 5.06% 4.56% 3.27% 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 2008 
891 742 562 467 
8.78% 7.31% 5.54% 4.60% 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 2009 
705 612 503 402 
6.94% 6.03% 4.95% 3.96% 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 2010 
294 257 226 184 
2.32% 2.03% 1.79% 1.45% 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 2011 
452 389 314 223 
3.95% 3.4% 2.75% 1.95% 
1st  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 2012 
373 299 213 175 
3.13% 2.51% 1.79% 1.47% 
Whole Sample 
2961 2480 1981 1568 
4.85% 4.06% 3.25% 2.57% 
The table reports the number and the percentage of long and short portfolios that get positive profits taking advantage of the PCP violations. We distinguished by period and by commission level. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for long and short strategies profits, scenario C (Incorporating bid/ask spread and commission fees) 
 
Commission levels Minimum Profit Maximum Profit Mean Profit Total observations 
Long 
Crisis period 
Maximum 176.64 687.54 331.6 512 
Medium high 164.47 768.31 290.65 700 
Medium low  156.89 823.31 273.2 1026 
Minimum 111.73 1421.31 239.46 1285 
Post crisis period 
Maximum 213.64 334.73 303.85 454 
Medium high 104.75 469.99 323.75 566 
Medium low  96.85 863.4 294.75 711 
Minimum 5.94 1267.9 56.72 787 
Short 
Crisis period 
Maximum 143.94 634.73 219.93 986 
Medium high 143.06 703.97 384.3 1228 
Medium low  84.68 735.15 356.79 1535 
Minimum 10.58 1582 686.46 1842 
Post crisis period 
Maximum 278.54 912.85 425.34 582 
Medium high 169.56 1571.36 409.53 753 
Medium low  79.64 1596.47 394.67 945 
Minimum 73.43 1657.5 165.7 1119 
This table reports for each strategy (long and short) and each commission level: the minimum, the maximum, and the mean profit realized and the number of observed profitable portfolios over the whole sample.  The 
mean (€) value of violations reported for call options is calculated as the average of the arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation. The arbitrage profit (€) for each PCP deviation is calculated as per equation (6) for 
each call and equation (7) for each put, multiplied by monetary contract size €2.5. 
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Table 9: Ex-ante PCP violations in scenario A (No trading costs) 
  
Ex-ante Available observations Percentage  
Long  Short Total Ex-ante 
Long Short 
a b a b 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 2007 844 915 3574 3418 23.61% 24.69% 25.6% 26.77% 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 2008 1702 3124 11318 9972 15.04% 17.07% 27.60% 31.33% 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 2009 1187 2691 10152 8629 11.69% 13.76% 26.51% 31.19% 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 2010 876 1210 12648 9845 6.93% 8.9% 9.57% 12.29% 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 2011 967 1164 11433 9436 8.46% 10.24% 10.18% 12.34% 
1st  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 2012 876 1048 11905 8997 7.36% 9.74% 8.8% 11.65% 
Whole Sample 6452 10152 61030 50297 10.57% 12.83% 16.63% 20.18% 
The table reports, for each period and for the whole sample, the number of long and short ex-ante violations, the number of available observations both in the total (ex-post) sample and in the ex-ante one and the 
percentage a and b for the two strategies recorded in scenario A. 
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Table 10: Ex-ante PCP violations in scenario B and C(Incorporating bid/ask spread and commission fees)  
  
Scenario B Scenario C 
Available Observations TC=0 TC>0 
    1   2   3   4   
Ex-ante  Total L S L S L S L S L S 
1st  Oct 2007 – 31st Dec 
2007 
No. of violations 346 451 184 216 113 153 34 74 13 25 
975 3574 Percentage a 9.68% 12.62% 5.15% 6.04% 3.16% 4.28% 0.95% 2.07% 0.36% 0.7% 
Percentage b 35.49% 46.27% 18.87% 22.15% 11.59% 15.69% 3.49% 7.59% 1.33% 2.56% 
1st  Jan 2008 – 31st Dec 
2008 
No. of violations 412 815 348 752 102 301 42 180 4 9 
 
2015 
 
 
11318 
 
Percentage a 3.64% 7.20% 3.07% 6.64% 0.90% 2.66% 0.37% 1.59% 0.04% 0.08% 
Percentage b 20.45% 40.45% 17.27% 37.32% 5.06% 14.94% 2.08% 8.93% 0.20% 0.45% 
1st  Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 
2009 
No. of violations 415 648 399 502 99 246 39 176 5 6 
 
1785 
 
 
10152 
 
Percentage a 4.09% 6.38% 3.93% 4.94% 0.98% 2.42% 0.38% 1.73% 0.05% 0.06% 
Percentage b 23.25% 36.30% 22.35% 28.12% 5.55% 13.78% 2.18% 9.86% 0.28% 0.34% 
1st  Jan 2010 – 31st Dec 
2010 
No. of violations 296 333 243 241 131 180 61 73 7 14 
1874 12648 Percentage a 2.34% 2.63% 1.92% 1.91% 1.04% 1.42% 0.48% 0.58% 0.056% 0.11% 
Percentage b 15.8% 17.77% 12.97% 12.86% 6.99% 9.61% 3.26% 3.9% 0.37% 0.75% 
1st  Jan 2011 – 31st Dec 
2011 
No. of violations 418 441 308 410 217 302 97 167 17 21 
1676 11433 Percentage a 3.66% 3.86% 2.69% 3.59% 1.9% 2.64% 0.85% 1.46% 0.15% 0.18% 
Percentage b 24.94% 23.31% 18.38% 24.46% 12.95% 18.02% 5.79% 9.96% 1.01% 1.25% 
1st  Jan 2012 – 31st Dec 
2012 
No. of violations 312 233 173 340 124 202 57 73 10 17 
1724 11905 Percentage a 2.62% 1.96% 1.45% 2.86% 1.04% 1.70% 0.48% 0.61% 0.08% 0.14% 
Percentage b 18.10% 13.52% 10.03% 19.72% 7.19% 11.72% 3.31% 4.23% 0.58% 0.99% 
Whole Sample 
No. of violations 2199 2921 1655 2461 786 1384 330 743 56 92 
10049 
 
61030 
 
Percentage a 3.60% 4.79% 2.71% 4.03% 1.29% 2.27% 0.54% 1.22% 0.09% 0.15% 
Percentage b 21.88% 29.07% 16.47% 24.49% 7.82% 13.77% 3.28% 7.39% 0.56% 0.92% 
The table reports, for each period and for the whole sample, the percentage a and b for the two strategies recorded in scenarios B and C and, in the last column, the number of available observations both in the total 
(ex-post) sample and in the ex-ante one. 
 
